In recent years, official public political attributions—a government entity’s public disclosure of information tying malicious cyber operations to another state through official channels—have gained traction as a policy instrument to establish accountability for malicious cyber activities, among other objectives. At the same time, there is no clear shared understanding among states about what characterizes a responsible use of this instrument, which could contribute to preventing misunderstandings and increasing the predictability of inter-state conduct. Attribution remains only marginally addressed in the context of diplomatically negotiated cyber norms so far. This makes this field well suited to explore the formation of normative ideas through state practice as it leaves ample room for practical interpretation by states.
Based on four case studies (Australia, Germany, Japan, and the United States), this paper identifies which cyber operations the selected states have publicly attributed, how the attribution was communicated and justified, and to what extent other states were involved in the process. The paper proposes and applies a framework of 13 parameters that serves to identify similarities and differences—areas of convergence and divergence—across countries, permitting new insights into how states currently perceive the respective normative framework.